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Michael Jackson: His Life and His Death Michael Jackson, the 50-year-old musical superstar, died June 25, 2009, just as he was preparing for a series of 50 concerts starting July 13 at London's famed 02 arena.

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Old 05-14-2005, 01:31 PM
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Arrow Filed Motions "Jackson Case" 1133603

FILED MAY 10, 2005

THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR. DISTRICT ATTORNEY

County of Santa Barbara

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SANTA MARIA DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff

vs

MICHAEL JOE JACKSON

Defendant

No.1133603

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF

PURPORTED PRIOR SEX ACTS

WITH MINOR WITNESS PURSUANT

TO EVIDENCE CODE 352

DATE: May 3, 2005

TIME: 8:30 AM

DEPT.: SM2 (Melville)

INTRODUCTION

The defense has provided an affidavit and interview report regarding the proposed testimony of witness Angel Vivanco. Mr Vivanco will apparently testify that during his employment at Neverland Ranch, he struck up a "quasi-sexual" relationship with then 16 year-old sister of the 288 (a) charges currently on trial. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Vivanco was an adult at the time of the purported sexual conduct, and the nature of that conduct is punishable as a felony under Penal Code section 288a(b)(1), the defense apparently offers this testimony in order to attack the credibility of Davelin Arvizo.

EVIDENCE OF A WITNESS’ SEXUAL CONDUCT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED UNDER E.C. and 1101(a)

This issue of whether or not Arvizo engaged in sexual conduct with the proffered witness falls squarely within the exclusionary rule of Evidence Code section 352 and 1101 (a).

Otherwise relevant evidence is generally "inadmissible" in a criminal case if it is "evidence of a person’s character or trait of his or her character...when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." because Evidence Code section 1101. Subdivision (a) says so. In most cases, the proffered "bad character" evidence is evidence of the defendant’s prior commission of certain crimes, the relevance of which is that the defendant’s track record demonstrates his"disposition" to commit such crimes. However, in this instance it is offered as a collateral attack on the credibility of a prosecution witness and victim of the conspiracy count. It is a transparent attempt to smear this victim of the current offense. Ironically, the offered testimony shows not that she is of "bad character," but instead that she was a victim of felonious sexual misconduct by a defense witness employed by the defendant.

While generally a defendant can introduce evidence of a character trait of a crime victim, that evidence must be relevant and pass the 352 hurdle. In People v. Chandler, (1997)56 Cal.App.4th 703, at 711, the court held that exclusion of a defense witness’ testimony regarding the sexual history of the complaining witness was proper in that it did not pass the test of 352. Specifically, the conduct was not relevant to her credibility.

Evidence Code section 352 serves as an overall limitation on otherwise relevant evidence in all lawsuits, criminal or civil. It provides: "The court, in its discretion, may exclude evidence it its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the jury."

The defense has offered nothing to this court explaining why the alleged fact of Davelin’s prior victimization should be heard in this matter. There is simply no relevancy. For these reasons, the evidence should be excluded.

DATED: MAY 3, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS W. SNEDDON ,JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY
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Old 05-14-2005, 03:22 PM
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FILED MAY 10, 2005

THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR. DISTRICT ATTORNEY

County of Santa Barbara

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SANTA MARIA DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff

vs

MICHAEL JOE JACKSON
Defendant

No.1133603

PLAINTIFF’S

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION

TO EXCLUDE HEARSAY

TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS ANGEL VIVANCO PURSUANT TO

EVIDENCE CODE 352

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this supplemental motion is to oppose additional statements of Mr. Vivanco purportedly made to him by Davelin Arvizo. The statements are hearsay and lay opinion evidence and not relevant to any issue in this case, as will be discussed below.

HEARSAY STATEMENTS AND LAY OPINION EVIDENCE ARE INADMISSIBLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES

The Defense has not offered a basis for the admissibility of the following

hearsay/opinion statements allegedly made by Davelin Arvizo to their witness Angel Vivanco:

a) That Davelin did not get along with her mother;

b) That Davelin did not like the "new" boyfriend;

c) That Davelin thought the new boyfriend has a bad influence on her mother;

d) That Davelin said her mother would do whatever the new boyfriend would say;

e) That Davelin called her mother ‘Psycho Mom’ and spoke badly about her all the time;

f) That Davelin ‘ didn’t think much of her brothers’;

g) That Davelin said her mother was ‘not okay in the head;

h) That Davelin missed her real father;

I) That the divorce of her parents was all her mother’s fault because she had an affair;

j) That Davelin said her mother was ‘making her do something’ and ‘something bad is going to happen’;

k) That Davelin ‘doesn’t want to talk to her mom, doesn’t want to see her mom’;

l) That Davelin commented on the size of her mother’s breasts prior to receiving implants;

m) That Davelin said her mother wold leave her and the boys alone ‘for no reason’;

n) That Davelin discussed her sexual history with Vivanco;

Furthermore, none of these alleged statements are relevant to the issues before the Court.

Insofar as many of the statements seem to offer an opinion from Davelin regarding her mother or Jay Jackson’s credibility, such opinions are clearly inadmissible. People v. Zambrano. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, has this to offer on that subject; "Our state Supreme Court has recognized that a lay witness’s opinion about the veracity of another person’s particular statement is inadmissible and irrelevant on the issue of the statements’ credibility.

(People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741 ].) The high court reasoned that such lay opinion testimony invades the province of the jury as the ultimate fact finder, is generally not helpful to clear understanding of the lay witness’s testimony, is not "properly founded character or reputation evidence," and does not bear on "any of the other matters listed by statute as most commonly affecting credibility" in Evidence Code section 780, subdivisions (a) through (k). ( People v. Melton. supra, at p. 744.) The high court therefore concluded that "such an opinion has no ‘ tendency in reason’ to disprove the veracity of the statement. "(Ibid.; see also Evid. Code, 210,350,780,& 800; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App. 3d 34, 39-40 [ 187 Cal. Rptr. 4971: People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 581.628 [134 Cal. Rptr.2d 1. 68 P.3d 302] [jury as capable as expert to assess credibility of defendant’s statement].)(Id. At 239-240.)

The People request these hearsay statements and lay opinion matters be excluded as without proper foundation and pursuant to section 352 of the Evidence Code.

DATED MAY 11, 2005
THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR. DISTRICT ATTORNEY

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Old 05-15-2005, 02:53 AM
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F I L E D MAY -6 2005

THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR DISTRICT ATTORNEY

By RONALD J. ZONEN (State Bar No. 85094)

Senior Deputy District Attorney

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA

SANTA MARIA DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

V.

MICHAEL JOE JACKSON

No. 1133603

PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL BRIEF RE:

ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S

RELEVANT CHARACTER TRAIT: CROSS-EXAMINATION OF CHARACTER

WITNESS AND REBUTTAL EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT’S CHARACTER

A. Discussion

Defendant may offer evidence in the form of witness testimony concerning his good character by the witness’s knowledge of the defendant’s reputation for the good character trait (here, doesn’t molest boy’s in the community where he lives or works (Evid. Code 1324):

–opinion of the witness (Evid. Code. 800) concerning defendant’s good character for the trait in question, based on personal knowledge (Evid. Code 702: see People v. McAlpine (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1309-1310 [opinion of witness that not a person given to lewd conduct with children, based on their observation of his own conduct with their daughters, properly the subject of opinion evidence and relevant to charges of molesting young girls].And see People v. Callahan, supra,74 Cal. App.4th 356,374-375 [error to exclude testimony of defendant’s 18-year-old niece that defendant never touched her in an inappropriate manner when he baby-sat her as a child, because evidence was relevant to his propensity to molest young girls, other evidence of which had been offered by the prosecution pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108].

It is relevant to keep in mind that a defendant’s introduction of good character evidence is by no means a risk-free proposition. Two grave risks face the criminal defendant who chooses to...offer[] evidence of her good character. The first and most serious risk...arises when the prosecutor cross-examines the defendant’s character witness...[W]hen cross-examining either a reputation or opinion witness, the prosecutor can inquire about specific acts in the defendant’s pass to assess the value of the reputation or opinion testimony...[Although in] theory,the trier of fact cannot use the prosecutor’s questions about specific acts as evidence that the acts occurred...[and] upon request, the defendant is entitled to a limiting jury instruction[,] (it is well recognized) that jurors probably cannot follow a judge’s instruction not to use the question and responses about specific acts as evidence that the acts did occur...The second risk is {that}...the prosecutor can call rebuttal witnesses to testify that the defendant’s character is bad.

(People v. McAlpin.supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289,1315 (conc.& dis.opn. Of Broussard,J.).)

"The probative value of personal opinion or reputation evidence of a defendant’s good character traits to prove that he did not commit a charged crime or to support his credibility as a witness is slight at best." (People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824,892,reversed on other grounds in People v. Kimble 91988)44 Cal.3d 480,498.)

B. Cross-examination of the "reputation" witness

The "reputation for good character" witness can be asked on cross-examination whether, that witness had heard of some specific act inconsistent with a good reputation for the trait in question. (See People v. Marsh (1962) 58 Cal.2d 732,745; People v.Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612,619: People v.Hurd 91970) 5 Cal.App.3d 865, 879-880;

The People may use the testimony of other persons regarding defendant’s reputation to bebut that evidence.

C. Cross-examination of the "opinion"witness

The " I- have-an-opinion,-based-on-personal-observation,-that-defendant-has-a-good-character-for-behaving-himself-with-young-boys" opinion character witness can be asked whether that witness is aware of certain conduct inconsistent with the character trait in question (if so, what effect does that have on the witness’s opinion; if not, and if what was suggest was true, is the witness’s opinion now different)."Have you heard" questions on cross-examination of the "opinion" witness are also proper (People v. Hurd, supra Cal.App.3d 865 at p. 880; People v. Hemstead (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 949, 953-954.)

Topic for impeachment of character witness include the following:

–All details of Jordie Chandler allegations as depicted in his interview W/LAPD and LADA and the affidavit of the s/w;

–All 1108 witnesses, include Jonathan Spence and Jimmy Safechuck. Events as outlined in the statement of Marie Quindoy as given to law enforcement witnessing acts of molestation. Statement of Norma Stokes, and Miko Brando about not leaving their kids alone with Michael Jackson;

-Statement of Latoya Jackson. Defendant’s sister, said on national television that she saw a payment of $ 1m check to Jimmy Safechuck’s family for purposes of buying silence:

– Evidence that Defendant has taken numerous children into his room and bed while heavily addicted to Demerol and other controlled substances

–Evidence that Defendant has given alcohol to children:

–Evidence that defendant has been reckless in his care and treatment of his own children by dangling one over the balcony of his hotel and buying exposing the other to danger in a public crowd:

–That defendant keeps and maintains a large quantity of sexually explicit material and shows it to children for purposes of his own sexual gratification:

DATED: May 6, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR.

District Attorney

Attorney for Plaintiff
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Old 05-15-2005, 02:55 AM
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Jacko: A Question Of Character

D.A. seeks to air more dirty laundry in Michael Jackson trial

MAY 12--If Michael Jackson's lawyers seek to introduce character testimony from the singer's family and friends, prosecutors want to pepper these witnesses with questions about Jackson's drug addiction, the dangling of his youngest child from a hotel balcony, and his sister LaToya's claim that he paid $1 million in hush money to a young boy. In a court filing made public last night, Santa Barbara District Attorney Tom Sneddon (pictured at right) detailed how prosecutors planned to cross-examine prospective witnesses called to vouch for Jackson's character (such testimonials would presumably come from the likes of Elizabeth Taylor and Quincy Jones). The government filing was made at the direction of Judge Rodney Melville, who will soon rule on the scope of the questioning of character witnesses. The legal brief, a copy of which you'll find below, outlines various topics that the D.A. wants to broach with Jackson intimates--many of which have not surfaced at the ongoing molestation trial. Included in this sleazy laundry list is "evidence" that Jackson "has been reckless in his care and treatment of his own children" and that two former employees made statements--apparently to law enforcement officials--that they would not leave their own children alone with the entertainer. Prosecutors also want permission to air the graphic molestation claims made by Jordan Chandler, the Los Angeles boy who settled a 1993 lawsuit against Jackson for about $20 million. While jurors have learned of the Chandler settlement, they are unaware of the amount and the tawdry details of the boy's alleged molestation. (4 pages)
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Old 05-21-2005, 10:43 PM
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Arrow WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

F I L E D MAY 16, 2005

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY of SANTA BARBARA

COLLINS, MESEREAU,REDDOCK & YU

Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr., State Bar Number 091182

Case No. 1133603

BRIEF RE: WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Defendant, MICHAEL JACKSON, submits the following briefs in support of his contention that the attorney client privilege between himself and Mark Geragos was waived only as to the relevant time period relating to the alleged conspiracy ending March 12, 2003 and, in no event, should extend beyond the commencement of adversary proceeding at the time of his arrest on November 20, 2003. Any purported waiver beyond that date should be rescinded and, whether or not the Court were to find a waiver occurred, the Court should not permit inquiry beyond the end of the alleged conspiracy and, in no event, beyond the commencement of the adversary proceedings on November 20, 2003 on the grounds that to do otherwise would violate Mr. Jackson’s right under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, under the California Constitution and relevant case and statutory law. This brief incorporates the pleading, records, files, testimony and evidence herein and such other papers or evidence as the Court may permit at and before the hearing hereon.

DATED: MAY 16, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

COLLINS, MESEREAU, REDDOCK & YU

Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr.

Susan C. Yu
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Old 05-22-2005, 04:27 AM
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES




ARGUMENT


1.


MICHAEL JACKSON WAIVED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WITH REGARD TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH MR. GERAGOS DURING THE ALLEGED PERIOD OF THE CONSPIRACY



Mr. Jackson did not consent to a general waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Mr.Mesereau responded to the inquiry from the Court that Mr. Jackson had waived the attorney-client privilege so that Mr. Geragos could testify. (RT 10249:9-11.) On cross-examination, a written waiver was revealed that was stated to be for a limited time period. It is true that Mr. Mesereau did not delineate the scope of the waiver when he originally spoke and he apologized to the Court for failing to do so. Nevertheless, IT IS Mr. Jackson’s position that his waiver was limited from the beginning since it had to be construed under the circumstances within which it was given. As an initial point a limited waiver is allowed by Evidence Code Section 912. (Sec People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1139.) The language of Evidence Code Section 912, i.e. "With respect to a communication protected by the privilege," makes it clear that the privilege may be waived with regard to a particular communication, while maintaining the privilege as to other communications. Therefore, it was legally possible for the waiver to have been limited. PURSUANT TO Evidence Code Section 912, only the holder of the privilege, in this case Mr. Jackson, can consent to the disclosure of confidential communications. It is true that Mr. Jackson was present in court when Mr. Mesereau announced that he was waiving the attorney client privilege between Mr. Geragos and Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson was not asked on the record if he concurred. Instead, Mr. Mesereau prepared a written waiver which was presented to Mr. Jackson

1.Mr. Jackson is not unminded of the Court’s dissatisfaction at the manner in which the waiver was addressed in court. Mr. Jackson, however, respectfully addresses the issue from the perspective of the law of waivers and constitutional rights. The impact of Mr. Mesereau’s failure to delineate the waiver is regrettable, however, he apologized. In the long run any confusion from it does not prejudice the prosecution nor affect the manner in which the trial should proceed.

At the next break. That written waiver waived the privilege with regard to communications with Mr. Geragos from the time Mr. Geragos was retained up until the approximate date of Mr. Jackson’s arrest. 2

To the extent that Mr. Jackson’s silence during Mr. Mesereau’s statement that there was a waiver constitutes an impact waiver by Mr. Jackson, the Court should consider the context in which that disclosure was discussed. It is Generally the nature of what is ultimately to be disclosed that defines the scope of the waiver. The event that triggers the attorney-client privilege being waived is disclosure of the confidential communication, not an announcement that the holder intends to waive the privilege.( Lohman v. Superior Court (1978) Cal App.3d 90.)

Therefore, it follows that Mr. Jackson reasonably would have understood that the waiver in this case was as to confidential communications during the period that Mr. Geragos was alleged to have been involved in the alleged conspiracy. Mr. Jackson reasonably would have understood that he was waiving the privilege from the time Mr. Geragos was retained until the alleged end of the conspiracy on March 12, 2003. In no event would the waiver reasonably be expected to continue beyond Mr. Jackson’s arrest.

This is both consistent with the scope of the testimony on direct examination and with the scope of the subsequent written waiver. If Mr. Jackson’s silence during M. Meserau, statement that there was a waiver of attorney client privilege is implied to Mr. Jackson, it does not follow that there has been a general waiver of the privilege. 3 Instead, as argued in more detail below, it would not be reasonable for a defendant to waive his fundamental post-arrest

3 The written waiver, hurriedly prepared by Mr. Meseraeu and Ms. Yu at the break mentions a date in December of 2003. However, Mr. Geragos clarified, on the record, that the date of arrest was actully in November of 2003, and implied that a waiver beyond that point, to a date in December, would raise a question as to whether such a waiver was informed. (RT 10334:14-19.) We ask the Court to take notice from the files herein that the search warrants were executed in this case on November 18, 2003 and that Mr. Jackson voluntarily surrendered himself and was arrested on November 20, 2003.

3. Mr Mesereau does not intend to minimize his failure to delineate the extent of the waiver nor does he intend to detract from his sincere apology before the Court. However, his broad statement still has to be construed in light of the context and, certainly, any implied waiver on the part of Mr. Jackson based on that statement has to be construed in light of Mr. Jackson’s reasonable understanding within that context.

constitutional rights, nor would it be reasonable for him to waive any more of the sacred attorney client privilege than was at issue in the proceedings as defined by the scope of direct examination of Mr. Geragos. Therefore, the scope of direct (and the scope of relevant inquiry on cross examination) should place the end of the waiver at March 12, 2003. If nothing else, the arrest of the defendant on November 20, 2003, must be the outward limit. This later date is consistent with the written waiver ultimately given to Mr. Geragos.



II.


A GENERAL WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WOULD DEPRIVE MR. JACKSON OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH,SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION



The waiver of the attorney-client privilege in a criminal case implicates important constitutional rights. Expanding the waiver beyond November 20, 2003, the date Mr. Jackson surrendered and was arrested, will result in a violation of Mr. Jackson’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. ( See Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201; Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610.) These rights are also secured by the California Constitution and relevant case and statutory law. Waiver of fundamental Constitutional rights require a knowing and intelligent waiver by a defendant either in writing or by way of vior dire of the defendant in person on the record In Boykin v, Alabama (1969) U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that even if a defendant is represented by an attorney, a court may not accept a guilty plea from him until it determines both that he is aware of the constitutional rights waived by pleading guilty namely, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers–and that he has knowingly and voluntarily chosen to waive those rights.

Subsequently, In re Thal (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 122,132, the California Supreme Court interpreted the refusal of the majority in Boykin to presume waiver of the three enumerated rights from a silent record to mean that the record must show on its face that the defendant was made aware of his rights and that has expressly waived them.

Here, Mr. Jackson is the defendant in a serious felony case. His former lawyer, Mark Geragos, not only represented him prior to arrest but after arrest, after arraignment on the criminal complaint and through pre-trial proceedings for several months until after his indictment.4 The waiver announced by Mr. Mesereau, were it construed as an open ended one, would have had the effect of waiving Mr. Jackson’s attorney client privilege during the course of this very litigation. Such a waiver could have far reaching consequences regarding documents, conversations, work-product and other privileged material during the actual adversary proceedings. Such a waiver would seriously compromise Mr. Jackson’s ability to defend himself in this trial. Therefore. any purported waiver of such a broad scope would have to be either in writing or by voir dire on the record and it could not be implied by silence.As argued below, it is not necessary to construe the waiver by Mr. Mesereau as open ended. However, if it were, such a waiver would implicate Mr. Jackson’s right to not incriminate himself, his right to remain silent following arrest and his right to counsel. If the waiver is not properly limited to apply only to the period of the alleged conspiracy or, at the most, to the pre-arrest time period, it would result in reversible error on the grounds that there was not an express waiver by the client of fundamental constitutional trial rights. Furthermore, there could be no tactical basis for counsel to have waived the privilege beyond that necessary to present evidence in the trial. Therefore, were such an over-broad waiver by counsel upheld by the Court, it would deprive Mr. Jackson of his Sixth Amendment rights.



III.


CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE END OF THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY AND CERTAINLY AFTER MR. JACKSONS WAS ARRESTED ARE IRRELEVANT AND BEYOND THE SCOPE OF DIRECT


EXAMINATION


It is really not necessary to wrestle with the Constitutional difficulties which would arise if

4 We respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice of these facts from the record of these proceedings.

there were found to be an open ended waiver of the attorney client privilege.. Cross-examination regarding communications that occurred after the end of the alleged conspiracy and, certainly, after Mr. Jackson’s arrest are inadmissible in any event. They are irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct examination. Therefore, whether or not there were a knowing and intelligent personal waiver of the privilege by Mr. Jackson, the District Attorney is still not allowed to inquire into any communications or material beyond either March 12, 2003 or, at worst, November 20, 2003.

Mr. Geragos was called as a witness to testify to claims of the prosecution that a conspiracy existed between February and March 12, 2003 involving Mr. Jackson, Mr. Geragos and other. 5

His testimony as to communications that occurred after the supposed conspiracy ended on March 12, 2003 are simply not relevant.

The prosecution’s right to full and fair cross-examination is not implicated here. There is not a situation in which direct examination was conducted under one set of rules, and then, on cross-examination, it was announced that another set of rules should apply. The direct examination of Mr. Geragos was focused on February and March of 2003. There was not a single inquiry on direct with regard to a communication between Mr. Jackson and Mr. Geragos that occurred following the arrest.

The only questions on direct examination that involved the post-arrest time period were with regard to when Mr. Geragos learned of the Brazil trip and his handling of the Arvizo’s passports. 9RT 10281:28-10282:2.) The relevance of when Mr. Geragos learned of the Brazil trip is limited to whether he was aware of the trip at the time of the alleged conspiracy. The question about the passports relates to real evidence that is not covered by the attorney-client privilege and was required to be disclosed in any event. The questions on these two areas did not implicate any confidential communication that would be subject to the attorney-client privilege. The prosecution is free to cross-examine Mr. Geragos regarding when he learned of the Brazil trip and his possession of the Arvizo’s passports.

------------------------

5 The prosecution has referred to Mr. Geragos as an unindicted co-conspirator in pre-trial motions.

While it is obvious that the prosecution would like to question Mr. Jackson’s former attorney regarding communications that occurred up until his departure from the case in April of 2004, these questions would be irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct examination. 6 Each of the questions marked by the Court at the end of the proceedings on Friday was objectionable as beyond the scope of direct, relevance and hearsay. Each question could properly have been asked if it had prefaced by, " During February and up to March 12, 2003..."

Here, the limited waiver of attorney-client privilege allows the prosecution to conduct a full and fair cross-examination of Mr. Geragos as to relevant issues. The limitations of relevance make the discussion of an implied open-ended waiver based on Mr. Mesereau’s remarks moot. Certainly the Court could conclude that the original statement was misleading-and for that Mr. Mesereau apologized-but, ultimately, it has no effect on the case.

In essence, the failure to delineate the scope of the waiver really had no effect on the case. The limited waiver would have been sufficient to permit the testimony of Mr. Geragos on direct examination. The prosecution would have been no less restricted on cross-examination whether there was a broad or a limited waiver. Therefore, the prosecution should not receive a windfall as a result of counsel’s statement nor should Mr. Jackson be penalized.



IV.


CONCLUSION


Mr. Jackson waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to privileged communications that occurred between February of 2003 and the end of the alleged conspiracy on March 12, 2003 based on the nature of the disclosed intended to be made. There is no basis to extend the waiver beyond Mr. Jackson’s arrest which is limit set out in the express written waiver signed by Mr. Jackson. The Court should consider that a general waiver would threaten to deprive Mr. Jackson of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

--------------------

6 The cross-examination question that immediately preceded Mr. Geragos clarifying that the written waiver was limited was whether Mr. Geragos had investigated the 1993 allegations against Mr. Jackson. (RT 10339:20-23.) This question is an example of a question that is both irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct examination.

Furthermore, questions regarding confidential communications or work product made after the arrest of Mr. Jackson are irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct examination. Therefore, a limitation on the waiver is not prejudicial to the opposing party..

Mr. Mesereau has apologized for his statement regarding the waiver. He indicated he did not intentionally mislead the Court. While it caused a disruption in the proceedings, Mr. Geragos would have had to return in any event. The purported waiver statement did not ultimately prejudice the prosecution. Therefore it is not necessary to fashion any other remedy other than to simply proceed with cross examination within the scope of direct and limit the waiver as stated.

DATED: May 16, 2005

Respectfully submitted.

COLLINS, MESEREAU.REDDOCK & YU

Thomas A. Mesereau Jr.



SANGER & SWYSEN

Robert M. Sanger

Stephen K. Dunkle




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F I L E D MAY 23, 2005

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY of SANTA BARBARA

COLLINS, MESEREAU,REDDOCK & YU

Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr., State Bar Number 091182

Case No. 1133603

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MICHAEL JOSEPH JACKSON


MOTION TO LIMIT INQUIRES OF JAY LENO

REGARDING OPINION AND SPECULATION


TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, TOM SNEDDON, AND DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GERALD FRANKLIN, RON ZONEN, GORDON AUCHINCLOSS AND MAG NICOLA:

Please take notice that the Defendant does hereby move and will further move on a date determined by the Court, a 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in Department 8 of the above entitled court, for an order prohibiting inquires of witness Jay Leno with regard to statements made to Detective Craig Bonner in a record interview, and for such other further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. In particular, the Court should prohibit questioning regarding Mr. Leno’s statements that he "think[s] Michael Jackson is guilty," that he thinks the prosecution "has a good case," and his speculation regarding the amount of evidence against Mr. Jackson. This motion is made, pursuant to Evidence Code Section 352, on the grounds that Mr. Leno’s statements are not probative, and that cross-examination regarding the statements would consume undue time and would tend to create substantial danger of undue prejudice.

This motion is based on this Notice of Motion, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, the papers ,records and files in this case, and such other matters as may be received by the Court at or after the hearing scheduled on this motion

Dated: May 23, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES



ARGUMENT




THE COURT SHOULD LIMIT INQUIRES OF MR. LENO REGARDING(1) HIS




OPINION OF MR. JACKSON’S INNOCENCE OR GUILT; HIS OPINION OF THE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE; AND (3) HIS


SPECULATION REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE POSSESSED BY THE PROSECUTION





Jay Lenohas been subpoenaed to appear as a percipient witness to the activities of the Arvizo family. Mr. Leno was interviewed by Detectives Craig Bonner regarding his interaction with Janet Arvizo and Gavin Arvizo. It is expected that he will testify that he received a telephone call from Janet Arvizo in which she stated that Gavin Arvizo loved Mr. Leno. At some point, Janet Arvizo put Gavin on the telephone to speak with Mr. Leno. Mr. Leno informed Det. Bonner that Gain sound "rehearsed" and "coached". He further stated that he could hear a woman in the background while Gavin was on the phone. This testimony is relevant because it tends to show that Janet Arvizo directed Gavin to ingratiate himself to wealthy and famous people in an effort to obtain money. This testimony corroborates that testimony of Vernee Watson Johnson.

During the interview with Det. Bonner, Mr. Leno offered his opinion regarding Mr. Jackson’s guilt, the strength of the prosecution’s case, and also speculated that there were 14,000 pieces of evidence in the possession of the prosecution. Mr. Leno’s opinion regarding the ultimate issue in this case, his opinion regarding the strength of the District Attorney’s case, and his speculation regarding the amount of evidence, are not probative of anything. As such, the Court should forbid inquires regarding these matters to prevent undue consumption of time and undue prejudice.

II.

CONCLUSION


Therefore, based on the reasons set forth, the court should prohibit inquiries of Mr. LENO REGARDING HIS OPINION PF Mr. Jackson’s innocence or guilt, his opinion of the prosecution’s case, and his speculation regarding the amount of evidence possessed by the prosecution

Dated: May 23, 2005

COLLINS, MESEREAU, REDDOCK & YU

Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr.
Susan C. Yu
SANGER & SWYSEN
Robert M. Sanger
Stephen K. Dunkle



Last edited by Royalpurple209 : 05-24-2005 at 11:27 PM.
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